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I. INTRODUCTION 
United States efforts to influence political process and policy-
making in developing countries often result in the destruction or 
seizure of private property located in foreign jurisdictions. Recently, 
individuals who owned property in Nicaragua, Honduras and EI 
Salvador sought compensation from the U.S. government under 
the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution (fifth amend-
ment)l following expropriation of their property.2 The claimants in 
I "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty or property ... nor shall private 
property be taken for public use without just compensation." u.s. CONST. amend. V. 
2 See Langenegger v. United States, 5 CI. Ct. 229, 230-31 (1984), afI'd in part and vacated 
in part, 756 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 824 (1985); de Arellano v. Weinberger, 
568 F. Supp. 1236, 1237-38 (D.D.C.), afI'd sub nom. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 724 
F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1983), different results reached on reh'g en bane, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 
1984), vacated and remanded, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985), on remand, 788 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1986); 
Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596, 597-99 (D.D.C. 1983), afI'd, 770 F.2d 202 
(D.C. Cir. 1985). 
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these cases maintained that United States foreign policy activities in 
Central America caused the expropriations, creating compensable 
takings under the fifth amendment's just compensation clause (for-
eign takings).3 Decisions in these cases highlight the possibility that 
those whose property is destroyed or seized as a result of U.S. 
activity abroad may obtain relief through "inverse condemnation" 
proceedings in U.S. courts. 
This Note examines the U.S. government's constitutional obli-
gation to compensate owners of property located outsroe U.S. ter-
ritory. Courts generally recognize this constitutional remedy for the 
excesses of U.S. foreign policy. The just compensation clause clearly 
applies outside United States territory when invoked by U.S. citi-
zens. Resident aliens also enjoy just compensation protection. Some 
authority indicates that foreign taking claims may also be brought 
by non-resident aliens. This Note outlines alternative arguments 
that may be advanced in support of the proposition that the just 
compensation clause protects non-resident aliens. Although U.S. 
policy-makers may be concerned at the prospect of compensating 
victims of overseas expropriations, foreign taking claims are not 
barred by the judiciary'S traditional deference to the political 
branches in the area of foreign relations. 
This Note proposes that courts retain a flexible approach to 
adjudicating foreign taking claims. "Indirect" United States involve-
ment in the domestic affairs of foreign sovereigns presents a sig-
nificant challenge to courts applying foreign takings authority. Most 
foreign taking cases address direct seizures of realty or personalty 
by the U.S. government or its agents. In Langenegger v. United States,4 
however, the United States Claims Court was faced with a just 
compensation claim alleging that advisory activity on the part of the 
U.S. government precipitated El Salvadoran land reform measures 
that deprived the plaintiff of his property. The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld the Claims Court's rejec-
tion of the claim by introducing and applying a restrictive threshold 
3 The Langenegger claimants sought monetary compensation under the fifth amendment 
for a plantation seized by the El Salvadoran government pursuant to a land reform program 
urged and designed by U.S. government advisors. 5 Cl. Ct. at 230-31. The Ramirez de Arellano 
plaintiffs sought injunctive relief where U.S. military advisors occupied a cattle ranch seized 
by Honduran troops. 568 F. Supp. at 1237-38. Plaintiffs in Sanchez-Espinoza sought injunctive 
relief and monetary compensation for property damage in Nicaragua caused by U.S.-backed 
contras. 568 F. Supp. at 597-99. For a general analysis of the illegality of the United States' 
intervention in Central America, see Note, Lawless Intervention: United States Foreign Policy in 
El Salvador and Nicaragua, 7 B.C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 223 (1988). 
45 Cl. Ct. 229. 
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test (the Langenegger test) to determine whether a compensable 
foreign taking occurred. This Note suggests that the Langenegger 
test should not be followed as it conflicts with the Supreme Court's 
approach of balancing private loss against public benefit to identify 
compensable property takings. 
II. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT'S GLOBAL REACH 
A. Guarantees Without Borders 
Courts hold that fifth amendment guarantees apply outside the 
United States.s In 1867, the Court of Claims in Wiggins v. United 
States,6 awarded compensation to a claimant whose gunpowder, 
stored in Punta Arenas, Costa Rica for sale to the Nicaraguan 
government, was destroyed by a U.S. naval commander. 7 The court 
reasoned, following the principle of awarding compensation for 
takings within the U.S., that the commander's action was an exercise 
of eminent domain and that the claimant should be compensated.s 
Similarly, in affirming a compensation award to a claimant whose 
mules and wagons were destroyed in Mexico by the U.S. Army, 
Chief Justice Taney wrote in 1851 for the Supreme Court in Mitchell 
v. Harmony:9 "[W]here the owner has done nothing to forfeit his 
[property] rights, every public officer is bound to respect them, 
whether he finds the property in a foreign or hostile country, or in 
his own."IO Since World War II, claimants have received compen-
5 E.g., Turney v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 457, 463-64 (Ct. Cl. 1953). 
63 Ct. Cl. 412 (1867). 
7 Circumstances surrounding the gunpowder destruction are reported as follows: 
The evidence ... tends to prove that in the early part of the year 1854 Commander 
Hollins, in command of the United States ship Cyane, was commissioned ... by his 
government to proceed to the town of San Juan [Nicaragua], . " and there to 
demand of the inhabitants of said town reparation for an alleged insult to the 
American minister .... 
That the authorities of [San Juan] refusing to comply with the demands of 
Hollins, he bombarded and destroyed the town. 
That a day, or a few days, after the destruction of [San Juan], Commander 
Hollins, ... for fear that the powder [stored at Punta Arenas] might by some 
malicious persons of [San Juan] be ignited ... ordered the powder to be thrown 
into the sea. Wiggins, 3 Ct. Cl. at 414 (Argument for the Claimants). 
8 See id. at 422. Specifically, the court analogized to the "principle" of Grant v. United 
States, 1 Ct. Cis. 41 (1863) (awarded compensation to a claimant whose property located in 
a U.S. territory was destroyed by the U.S. Army to prevent it from falling into insurrectionists' 
hands). 
954 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1851). 
10 Mitchell, 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 133 (discussing the government's assertion that claimant 
forfeited his property rights by "trading with the enemy"). 
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sation from the U.S. government for takings in foreign countries 
including Austria 11 and the Phillipines. 12 
Despite these early holdings, courts did not generally accept 
the proposition that some fifth amendment guarantees, such as the 
right to a grand jury indictment, should be extended to foreign 
jurisdictions until 1957. 13 Justice Felix Frankfurter attributed this 
view in large part to the existence of consular courts' "extraterri-
torial jurisdiction."14 Until 1956, consular courts were federal trial 
courts located in foreign countries pursuant to treaties ratified by 
the U.S. Senate. These courts exercised executive, legislative and 
judicial power over American citizens resident in those countries. 15 
The U.S. Supreme Court and U.S. Courts of Appeal upheld con-
sular courts' decisions against constitutional challenges, holding, in 
effect, that the United States Constitution applied to U.S. citizens 
abroad only to the extent that Congress provided. 16 Those opposed 
to compensating foreign takings referred to the existence of extra-
territorial jurisdiction in support of their position. For example, in 
dissent in Wiggins, Judge Loring suggested that the scope of extra-
territorial jurisdiction should not extend protections to property 
interests of those who subject their property to foreign lawY 
President Eisenhower abolished the last consular court in 
1956. 18 Within a year, the Supreme Court in Reid v. Covert l9 adopted 
the current view that the Bill of Rights extends without restriction 
II Seery v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 601 (Ct. Cl. 1955). 
12 Turney, 115 F. Supp. 457. 
13 See. e.g., Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (1955), 354 U.S. I (1957). Justice Hugo Black, 
writing for the Court in a subsequent reversing opinion, summarized the Court's initial 
holding: "The majority held that the provision[] of ... the Fifth ... Amendment[] which 
require[ s] that crimes be tried by a jury after indictment by a grand jury did not protect an 
American citizen when he was tried by the American Government in foreign lands for 
offenses committed there .... " 354 U.S. at 5. 
14 Reid, 354 U.S. at 54-64 (Frankfurter, J. concurring). 
15 [d. at 62-63. 
16 See id. at 54-55 (discussing In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891) (affirming denial of 
application for writ of habeas corpus by U.S. Navy crew member who was tried and convicted 
by a consular court in Yokohama, Japan). 
17 See Wiggins, 3 Ct. Cl. at 425 (Loring, J. dissenting) (,,[Extraterritorial jurisdiction] has 
never been, and cannot be, extended to such interests in property as our citizens may have 
as members of a corporation created by and existing under the laws of a foreign country"). 
Judge Loring appeared to justify extraterritorial jurisdiction as a necessary adjunct to colonial 
administration. See id. at 422 (Loring, J. dissenting) ("Under the law of nations, as held in 
Europe and in this country, governments have such extraterritorial jurisdiction as may protect 
their citizens in other countries not civilized . ... ") (emphasis added). 
18 Reid, 354 U.S. at 62 n.9 (Frankfurter, J. concurring). 
19 354 U.S. I. 
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to American citizens abroad: "When the Government reaches out 
to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights 
and other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and 
liberty should not be stripped away just because he happens to be 
in another land."20 This approach finds "plain meaning" support in 
the fifth amendment's protection of "persons," not geographical 
areas. 21 
Earlier decisions held that particular aspects of U.S. foreign 
relations, such as congressional governance of foreign territories, 
should be free of constitutional review. 22 These late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century decisions, referred to as the "Insular Cases," 
addressed the relationship between the United States and territories 
where the U.S. exercised sovereign power.23 The Insular Cases stood 
for the proposition that the Constitution's application should be 
limited geographically, in recognition of "the political reality that 
the strength of the United States did not extend to all aspects of 
life in its newly acquired territories."24 In Reid v. Covert, Justice 
Hugo Black rejected the reasoning of these decisions and wrote for 
the Court: 
If our foreign commitments become of such nature that the 
Government can no longer satisfactorily operate within the 
bounds laid down by the Constitution, that instrument can be 
amended by the method which it prescribes. But we have no 
authority, or inclination, to read exceptions into it which are 
not there. 25 
Since Reid, courts no longer seriously question whether the just 
compensation clause applies abroad. Instead, the focus of foreign 
20 Reid, 354 U.S. at 6. Accord United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 280 (2d Cir. 1974) 
("that the Bill of Rights has extraterritorial application to the conduct abroad of federal 
agents directed against United States citizens is well settled"). 
21 See supra note I. One commentator suggests that the theory of natural rights also 
supports the extraterritorial application of the Constitution. See Note, The Extraterritorial 
Application of the Constitution - Unalienable Rights?, 72 VA. 1. REV. 649, 649 (1986) (,,[DJecisions 
concerning the extraterritorial application of the Constitution are influenced by several 
divergent themes: the theory of natural rights, the concept of a sociai contract, and the 
doctrine of territoriality"). The author argues that the theory of natural rights has become 
increasingly persuasive in this area of constitutional jurisprudence as scholars and practition-
ers move away from the doctrine of territoriality and the concept of a constitutional social 
contract. Id. at 649-50. 
22 See, e.g., collected cases cited in Reid, 354 U.S. at 13 n.22. 
23 See Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 142 (1904). For a list of the Insular Cases, see 
Note, supra note 21, at 654 n.28. 
24 See McCauliff, The Reach of the Constitution: American Peacetime Court in West Berlin, 55 
NOTRE DAME LAW. 682, 684-89 (1980). 
25 Reid, 354 U.S. at 14 (footnotes omitted). 
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takings claims has shifted to determining what constitutes a com-
pensable taking by the U.S. government of property located in 
foreign jurisdictions and who may bring such claims. 
B. Compensable Foreign Takings and Remedies 
1. Compensable Claims 
Courts have steadily broadened their definition of a foreign 
taking. Courts uphold claims arising out of direct seizures of over-
seas property by the U.S. government. In Seery v. United States,26 for 
example, an individual U.S. citizen whose Austrian residence was 
appropriated by the U.S. Army and converted into an officers' club 
received monetary compensation under the just compensation 
clause.27 
Courts also hold that the fifth amendment applies when the 
U.S. secures possession of private property through the action of 
foreign sovereigns. In Turney v. United States,28 the Phillipine gov-
ernment seized a corporation's radar equipment located in the Phil-
lipines and turned the equipment over to the United States. The 
Court of Claims awarded the corporation monetary compensation 
pursuant to a taking claim.29 Although foreign sovereigns may be 
considered as agents of the U.S. in foreign taking claims such as 
Turney, the Constitution does not reach the independent actions of 
foreign government officials.30 Thus, a claim based on a taking 
effected by a foreign government must show that the taking was on 
behalf of the U.S. government. Courts determine whether a foreign 
government acts independently or on behalf of the United States 
by evaluating the particular circumstances of each case.3J 
The fifth amendment also seems to support foreign taking 
claims even where a foreign sovereign's seizure of property abroad 
does not result in the U.S. government acquiring a possessory in-
26 127 F. Supp. 60 I. 
27 Seery, 127 F. Supp. at 606. 
28 115 F. Supp. 457. 
29 Turney, 115 F. Supp. at 464. 
30 See Huther v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 916 (Ct. Cl. 1956) (U.S. not liable under 
just compensation clause where Canada constructed dam that caused flooding of plaintiffs' 
land). Cf. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 280, n.9. See also Saltzburg, The Reach of the Bill of Rights 
Beyond the Terra Firma of the United States, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 741, 741-42 (1980) ("The 
Constitution never limits the conduct of foreign officials not acting to a U.S. request for 
aid"). 
31 See Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 743-45 (9th Cir. 1968). 
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terest in the property. In Langenegger v. United States,32 the court 
indicated that the U.S. government could incur just compensation 
liability by encouraging the EI Salvadoran government to implement 
a land reform program resulting in seizure of the claimant's plan-
tation.33 Extending the fifth amendment's scope to such "indirect" 
takings recognizes that, at some point, U.S. government involve-
ment in a foreign sovereign's policy-making activity may be suffi-
cient to cause a taking.34 This recognition is consistent with a sig-
nificant presence in developing countries of the U.S. government 
and its agents acting as advisors concerning military and economic 
policy. Courts must accomodate in foreign takings law those foreign 
expropriations that would not have occurred but for these advisory 
activities. 
Judicial recognition of indirect takings under the just compen-
sation clause also affords relief for foreign expropriations that fall 
outside "ordinary" remedies as a result of U.S. involvement. Tra-
ditionally, U.S. citizens whose overseas property is expropriated by 
the act of a foreign government may pursue remedies including 
local actions against the expropriating foreign sovereign for com-
pensation in cash or its equivalent,35 or insurance claims under the 
federally-funded Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
["OPIC"].36 A citizen may also seek to convince the U.S. government 
to negotiate for compensation on his behalf with the expropriating 
sovereign.37 The latter remedy is complemented by the Foreign 
Assistance Act, through which Congress gave the President discre-
tionary power to cut off all U.S. assistance to expropriating coun-
tries that do not make compensation. 38 These remedies are not 
32 756 F.2d 1565. 
33 Langenegger, 756 F.2d 1571 ("There is nothing to suggest. as [the United States gov-
ernment] contends, that whenever the final act of expropriation is by the hand of a foreign 
sovereign, the United States cannot be held responsible") (emphasis in original). 
34 [d. at 1572. The Langenegger court found, however, on summary judgment disposition, 
that U.S. involvement was not sufficient to constitute a taking. [d. 
3.' See Note, infra note 80, at 210. 
36 The Overseas Private Investment Corporation ["OPIC"] is a federally-funded entity 
offering insurance to U.S. citizens conducting business overseas, established by Congress 
through 22 u.s.c. § 2191 (1982). Insurance benefits are triggered by losses caused by the 
action of a foreign government. 
37 See Note, infra note 80, at 210. 
38 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (1982). Courts are not empowered, however, to determine whether 
the executive has wrongfully failed to proceed under the Foreign Assistance Act, limiting 
the effectiveness of this Act as an individual remedy. Aerotrade, Inc. v. Agency for Inter-
national Development, 387 F. Supp. 974, 975-76 (1982). 
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triggered until a foreign sovereign expropriates property.39 Thus, 
substantial U.S. involvement in a foreign expropriation weakens the 
possible success of these "ordinary" expropriation remedies. 
With personalty and realty seizures, courts also entertain taking 
claims by individuals whose claims against a foreign sovereign are 
extinguished by acts of the U.S. 40 Claim extinguishment actions seek 
compensation in the amount that the claimant would have received 
if the underlying claim against a foreign sovereign had not been 
discharged or settled by the U.S. government. Since the underlying 
claims are filed in U.S. courts (otherwise the U.S. could not dis-
charge them), actions for extinguishment of these claims are not 
strictly foreign taking claims. Claim extinguishment actions are re-
lated to foreign taking claims, however, to the extent that both are 
just compensation claims arising out of U.S. foreign policy acts. 
Early "claim extinguishment" cases arose out of the fact that 
sovereign immunity formerly barred individuals from bringing 
claims against foreign sovereigns unless the U.S. government 
brought claims on their behalf.41 The federal government at times 
bargained away its right to pursue individuals' claims for conces-
sions in international negotiations after promising the individuals 
that it would pursue the claims, giving rise to fifth amendment 
actions. 42 
Recent taking actions for claim extinguishment also arise out 
of U.S. government negotiations with foreign sovereigns, although 
individuals are no longer barred by sovereign immunity doctrine. 
In 1982, for example, the U.S. and the People's Republic of China 
["PRC"] agreed to discharge and settle all then-pending expropri-
ation claims against the PRC in U.S. courts. In Shanghai Power Co. 
v. United States,43 a U.S. corporation had claims pending against the 
PRC at the time that the treaty was concluded. The corporation 
argued that the U.S. expropriated its property interests by extin-
guishing its claims through the treaty settlement. The court held 
that this was a valid cause of action under the fifth amendment, but 
found that the treaty settlement amount provided sufficient com-
39 OPIC, however, will pay benefits even if an expropriation results from a shift in U.S. 
foreign policy. 22 U.S.c. §§ 2191-99 (1982). 
40 E.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
41 See Note, The U.S.-Iran Accords and the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 68 VA. L. 
REV. 1537, 1542-47 (1982) (general discussion of foreign taking claims based on discharge 
or settlement of claims by the U.S. government). 
42Id. 
43 4 Cl. Ct. 237, 239-40 (1983). 
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pensation so as to render the taking constitutional.44 Courts deter-
mine whether a compensable taking occurred by claim extinguish-
ment on a case by case basis.45 
2. Equitable Remedies 
Although foreign taking claims often seek monetary compen-
sation, and are therefore adjudicated in the Court of Claims, in-
junctive and declaratory relief are also available in connection with 
a foreign taking. Courts grant such relief only after applying the 
doctrine of equitable discretion to the claim.46 This doctrine ensures 
that grants of extraordinary relief will not violate the constitutional 
separation of powers that consigns the conduct of foreign affairs to 
the executive branch. For example, the D.C. Circuit in Ramirez de 
Arellano offered the following reasoning in support of its holding 
that declaratory and injunctive relief could be appropriately granted 
to prevent U.S. military advisors from occupying a Honduran 
ranch: 47 
[T]he ... facts do not show that the Executive's conduct of 
foreign affairs would be impaired by an equitable decree that 
required the defendants to abide by United States constitutional 
... requirements. Plaintiffs ... merely ask the federal court to 
prevent the United States ... from running military training 
operations on their property, which has not been lawfully expro-
priated. Carefully tailored equitable relief might correct the 
unlawful condition without challenging the United States' rela-
tions with any Central American country or its military policy 
.... Separation of powers considerations do not fell the plain-
tiffs' complaint. 
In effect, the D.C. Circuit weighed the intrusiveness of the relief 
into the conduct of U.S. foreign policy against the immediate need 
for, and effectiveness of, the remedy sought. 
Courts may refuse to grant declaratory and injunctive relief 
where the claimant's request for relief becomes moot. 48 For exam-
ple, the D.C. Circuit later held in Ramirez de Arellano that the plain-
tiffs' plea for injunctive relief became "attenuated" when U.S. mil-
itary advisors departed voluntarily from the Honduran ranch.49 
44 Shanghai Power, 4 CI. Ct. at 239-40. 
45 See, e.g., Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1573. 
46 See, e.g., Ramirez de Arellano, 745 F.2d at 1521. 
47/d. at 1531. 
48 See Ramirez de Arellano, 788 F.2d at 764. 
49 [d. 
• 
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Although the court previously determined that the plaintiffs' claim 
for injunctive and declaratory relief was appropriate, the effect of 
"attenuation" was to partially moot the claim, narrowing the claim 
to a request for declaratory prohibition of the military advisors' 
return to the ranch. 50 The court held that the plaintiffs had no 
immediate need for such declaratory relief and, as a result, that the 
intrusiveness of the remedy into U.S. foreign affairs tipped the 
balance of the equities against extraordinary reliefY 
C. Just Compensation and Foreign Nationals 
1. Aliens' Property Located in the U.S. 
One need not be a U.S. citizen to bring a just compensation 
claim when a taking occurs within the United States. The fifth 
amendment protects resident aliens and U.S. citizens.52 In Russian 
Volunteer Fleet v. United States, a corporation organized under the 
laws of Russia brought a just compensation claim after the United 
States requisitioned the corporation's ships located in New York.53 
The Supreme Court held that the Constitution permitted the 
claim.54 The Russian Volunteer Court extended the just compensation 
clause to aliens' property within the U.S. by relying on its earlier 
decisions extending due process protections to aliens within the 
U.S.55 
2. Aliens' Property Located Outside the U.S. 
Whether aliens may invoke the just compensation clause with 
respect to private property located outside the U.S. is less clear. It 
is incongruous that an alien, protected by the fifth amendment 
inside the U.S.,56 should be subject to unconstitutional U.S. govern-
ment acts once outside American jurisdiction, while an American 
50 See id. 
5! See id. ("Now that equitable relief ... would merely forestall a potential violation, it is 
far from clear that a favorable disposition of plaintiffs' claims on the merits would warrant 
equitable relief that intrudes into the conduct of foreign and military affairs"). 
52 Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931),followed by United States 
v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 228 (1942). Cj. Au Yi Lau v. United States Immigration and Natural-
ization Service, 445 F.2d 217, 223 (aliens in the United States are protected by the fourth 
amendment), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971). 
53 Russian Volunteer, 282 U.S. 481. 
54Id. 
55Id. at 489 (citing, inter alia, Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896». 
56 See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text. 
• 
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expatriate has a constitutional claim for the same acts. Reid, how-
ever, has not completely quelled the appeal for some judges of 
earlier authority: "Neither the Constitution nor the laws passed in 
pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory unless in respect 
of our own citizens."'57 
This predicament is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's pre-
Reid declaration in Balzac v. Puerto Rico58 that "[t]he Constitution of 
the United States is in force ... whenever and wherever the sov-
ereign power of the government is asserted."59 Still, courts are 
content to leave this area of law in disarray by not reaching the 
question of whether the fifth amendment extends to aliens abroad.60 
For example, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals did not address a 
claim by twelve Nicaraguan citizens that the U.S. government's 
support of the Nicaraguan contras violated the fourth and fifth 
amendments of the U.S. Constitution, reasoning that no relief was 
available in any event. fil As Circuit Judge Wallace of the Ninth 
Circuit indicates, the application of the Consitution to aliens abroad 
requires a fusion of "one line of Supreme Court cases establishing 
that Ar;nerican citizens have constitutional rights abroad [with] an-
other line holding that aliens in the United States are entitled to 
constitutional safeguards .... "fi2 Several possible arguments may be 
advanced in favor of extending just compensation clause protections 
to aliens abroad. 
a. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger 
In Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia indicated that courts may be willing to 
entertain claims against the U.S. government by aliens whose prop-
erty is expropriated abroad, at least where U.S. citizens have some 
interest in the property.63 In 1983, the U.S. Department of Defense 
.07 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1230 (9th Cir. 1988) (Wallace, J. 
dissenting) (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936)). 
;R 258 U.S. 298 (1922). 
"., Balzac, 258 U.S. at 312-1:~ (held that constitutional due process guarantees protect 
U.S. citizens abroad). 
till E.g., Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 208. 
tilld. The Nicaraguans' suit, with joining suits by U.S. Congress members and residents 
of Florida, was brought in federal district court for the District of Columbia, and sought, 
inter alia, tort damages and injunctive relief, but did not contain a just compensation claim. 
Id. at 206-10. 
62 Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1230 (Wallace, .J. dissenting) (discussing whether the 
fourth amendment applies to aliens abroad). 
61 See Ramirez de Arellano, 745 F.2d 1500. 
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(DOD) decided to establish a "Regional Military Training Center" 
(RMTC) in Honduras to be used to train El Salvadoran soldiers.54 
The DOD selected the site on which the RMTC was built, and 
staffed the RMTC with U.S. military advisors including approxi-
mately 100 Green Berets.55 When completed, the RMTC occupied 
a portion of a cattle ranch and shrimp packing facility owned by a 
group of Honduran corporations. An individual American citizen, 
Temistocles Ramirez de Arellano, controlled the Honduran cor-
porations through stock ownership in a tiered group of Honduran 
and American corporations. 55 The Honduran corporations, their 
controlling entities and Ramirez de Arellano brought suit in U.S. 
district court alleging, inter alia, that the DOD's acts constituted "an 
unauthorized and unconstitutional deprivation of the use and en-
joyment of [the plaintiffs'] property."57 The plaintiffs also alleged 
that the DOD's establishment of the RMTC without notice or hear-
ing violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution.58 
Although these claims were ultimately dismissed for "attenua-
tion" upon withdrawal of U.S. military personnel from the RMTC,59 
the D.C. Circuit held that these allegations were sufficient to with-
stand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.70 The court held that the plaintiffs had standing 
due to Ramirez de Arellano's American citizenship,7l but specifically 
left open the question of whether the Honduran corporations could 
64 Ramirez de Arellano, 724 F.2d at 146. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. The ranch was owned by a Honduran corporation, in turn owned by three other 
Honduran corporations, in turn owned by Temistocles Ramirez de Arellano, an individual 
American citizen, through two United States corporations. Ramirez de Arellano, 745 F.2d at 
1506. 
67 Id. at 151!. 
68 Id. 
69 The Supreme Court vacated this decision and remanded the case to the Court of 
Appeals "for reconsideration of its opinion and judgment in light of the Foreign Assistance 
and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1985 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1884, 1893-
1894, and other events occurring since October 5,1984." Ramirez de Arellano, 471 U.S. 1113. 
On remand, the Court of Appeals found: 
since November 27, 1985 all U.S. military personnel have departed and all U .S.-
owned facilities have been removed from [plaintiffs'] land. Upon consideration of 
these recent developments, we are persuaded that dismissal of the complaint should 
be upheld on the narrow ground that the controversy has now become too atten-
uated to justify the extraordinary relief sought .... 
788 F.2d at 763-64 (footnote omitted). 
70 Ramirez de Arellano, 745 F.2d at 151!. 
7! Id. at 1515-20. 
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independently raise constitutional claims.72 The majority resisted 
then Appeals Court Judge Scalia's argument in dissent that the 
plaintiffs should look only to Honduran law for a remedy because 
Honduran corporations directly owned the ranch. 73 The majority 
observed: 
[T]he corollary to Judge Scalia's position is not true: a United 
States citizen cannot escape the prescriptive reach of United 
States law solely by choosing to do business through a foreign 
corporation .... Constitutional rights and duties are closely 
related in scope; if the Constitution permits such a broad ex-
ercise of prescriptive power, then the protective reach of the 
Constitution should extend equally far. 74 
The D.C. Circuit's rejection of Judge Scalia's position supports the 
proposition that aliens should not be categorically barred from 
bringing foreign taking claims. In part, the court's holding rests on 
the fact that the plaintiffs included American persons whose inter-
ests in the ranch were interwoven with the Honduran corporations' 
interests. Nonetheless, the court's language is consistent with a po-
sition that aliens may invoke the protection of the just compensation 
clause in their own right whenever they are subject to the "prescrip-
tive reach" of V.S. law. 
b. The Fourth Amendment Model 
Other courts have extended constitutional protections to aliens 
abroad by reasoning, similar to the D.C. Circuit in Ramirez de Arel-
lano, that such protections of necessity accompany and constrain 
the federal government's conduct. At least one decision suggests 
reasoning on which fifth amendment protections could be extended 
to aliens. In United States v. Toscanino,75 the V.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit held that the fourth amendment protects 
aliens against certain egregiously illegal searches and seizures by 
V nited States officials outside the V nited States. 76 The court de-
clared that any other result would be inconsistent with cases such 
as Mapp v. Ohio that prohibit the government from benefitting from 
72 [d. at 1516. 
"[d. at 1520 n.79 (responding to Scalia,.J., dissenting at 1550). 
74 [d. at 1517 n.63. 
75 500 F.2d 267, reh'g denied, 504 F.2d 1380 (2d Cir. 1974). 
76 Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (U.S. government agent's arrest of an alien outside the United 
States by means violating fourth amendment search and seizure standards, including deten-
tion and torture during interrogation, invalidated the alien's subsequent conviction in federal 
district court). 
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illegal police conduct in obtaining evidence.77 The court reasoned 
that "the government should be denied the right to exploit its own 
illegal conduct, and when an accused is kidnapped and forcibly 
brought within the jurisdiction, the court's acquisition of power over 
his person represents the fruits of the government's exploitation of 
its own misconduct."78 Extending this reasoning to aliens and just 
compensation protections, one could argue that the government 
may not engineer property takings under its foreign policy powers 
and simultaneously avoid the fifth amendment's restrictions on pub-
lic use of private property. Foreign policy objectives achieved in this 
fashion appear to fall in the category of "fruits of the government's 
... misconduct" prohibited by Toscanino. 
The Toscanino court referred in its reasoning to fifth amend-
ment decisions holding that the Constitution guarantees due process 
to "people," not to "citizens."79 This "plain meaning" approach 
strengthens a position that Toscanino's government misconduct anal-
ysis should be persuasive in foreign taking claims, as the just com-
pensation clause's scope is defined by the same "people" that mod-
ifies the due process clause. Courts have also left open the possibility 
that fourth amendment illegal search and seizure doctrine may be 
of value in adjudicating fifth amendment foreign taking claims, 
increasing the applicability of Toscanino. 80 
Post-Toscanino decisions hold that Toscanino articulates a narrow 
exception to the general "Ker-Frisbie" doctrine that aliens cannot 
challenge the jurisdiction of American courts, even when they are 
77 See id. at 272 (citing, inter alia, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961». 
78Id. at 275 (citation omitted). 
79Id. at 280 (citing, inter alia, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) and Russian 
Volunteer Fleet, 282 U.S. 481). 
80 Some courts hold that evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment by 
federal government agents should be excluded from state court trials as the federal/state 
nexus constitutes a '1oint venture" sufficient to trigger the exclusionary rule. Joint venture 
doctrine was developed to prevent state law enforcement officials from avoiding fourth 
amendment requirements by introducing evidence illegally obtained by federal government 
agents. See generally collected cases in Note, Alleged United States Involvement in Land Reform 
Program of El Salvador Did Not Support Fifth Amendment Taking Claim, 20 TEXAS INT'L L. J. 
210,212 n.24 (1985). Courts continue to extend the joint venture doctrine in some circum-
stances to exclude evidence obtained illegally in foreign countries. See, e.g., Verdugo-Urquidez, 
856 F.2d 1214; United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1987). In Langenegger, 5 Cl. 
Ct. at 232-33, the trial court rejected the claimants' argument that fourth amendment '1oint 
venture" doctrine, by analogy, imposed just corrtpensation liability on the U.S. government 
for its role in an El Salvadoran land reform program that expropriated claimants' plantation. 
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, however, affirmed the Court of Claims' 
dismissal on different grounds, and did not address the fourth amendment analogy. Lange-
negger, 756 F.2d 1565. 
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brought before such courts by illegal acts of U.S. agents. 81 The Ker-
Frisbie doctrine, however, is based on the view that "due process of 
law is satisfied when one present in court is convicted of crime after 
being fully apprised of the charges against him and after a fair trial 
in accordance with constitutional proceduralsafeguards."82 No such pro-
cedural safeguards exist to protect non-resident aliens against the 
excesses of the U.S. government's conduct of foreign policy. Thus, 
subsequent limitation of Toscanino's scope in the criminal context 
does not necessarily limit its persuasiveness in the area of foreign 
takings. 
d. Uniform Constitutional Protections 
Even if Toscanino has been weakened, other authority supports 
the proposition that aliens abroad are protected against the U.S. 
government by the Constitution. In United States v. Tiede,83 the 
United States Court for Berlin84 held that the Constitution's sixth 
amendment's jury trial provision applied to an alien brought before 
that court. 85 The Tiede court reasoned that "American courts abroad 
should not differ from those accorded defendants tried in American 
courts in the United States."86 In support of its holding, the Tiede 
court quoted an early Supreme Court opinion: "[The Constitution] 
'is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and 
covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, 
and under all circumstances.'''87 Tiede's holding and broad dicta 
concerning constitutional protections support the notion that aliens 
81 The "Ker-Frisbie" doctrine was articulated in Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886) and 
affirmed in Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952), reh'g denied, 343 U.S. 937. Most post-
Toscanino courts hold that Toscanino's exception to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine applies only where 
governmental misconduct is outrageous and flagrant. See, e.g., United States ex rel Lujan v. 
Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 65-66 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975). For recent decisions 
reaffirming Ker-Frisbie, see, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039-40 
(1984); United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980); id. at 477-79 (Powell,]. concurring 
in part) (White, j., concurring in result) (majority of court reaffirming Frisbie). See also 
generally, Annotation,jurisdiction of Federal Courts to Try Criminal Defendant Who Alleges that He 
Was Brought Within United States jurisdiction Illegally or as a Result of Fraud or Mistake, 28 A.L.R. 
FED 685 (1976). 
82 Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 522 (emphasis added). 
83 86 F.R.D. 227 (U .S. Ct. Berlin 1979). 
84 The United States Court for Berlin, established in 1955 and sitting in Berlin, West 
Germany, "is a court established pursuant to the powers granted to the President by Article 
II of the United States Constitution." Tiede, 86 F.R.D. at 237. 
85 See id. at 259-60. 
86 [d. at 252. 
87 [d. at 242 (quoting Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120-21 (1866)). 
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should enjoy uniform just compensation protections within and 
without the United States. This principle of uniform constitutional 
protections also is reflected in the Supreme Court's decision in 
Johnson v. Eisentrager,88 holding that alien enemies should be denied 
constitutional protections in foreign jurisdictions because they do 
not enjoy such protections within the U.S. 
e. Johnson v. Eisentrager 
Some decisions indicate that aliens may not enjoy constitutional 
protection outside the U.S. For example, the Supreme Court in 
Johnson v. EisentragerB9 held in a pre-Reid decision that German 
nationals, captured, convicted and confined overseas by an Ameri-
can military court for engaging in military activity against the U.S., 
had no Article I right to a writ of habeas corpus.90 The Court 
supported its decision in part by quoting its earlier statement that 
constitutional "provisions are universal in their application, to all 
persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differ-
ences of ... nationality .... "91 The Court stated further that 
"[e]xtraterritorial application of [the Constitution to aliens] would 
have been so significant an innovation in the practice of govern-
ments that, if intended or apprehended, it could scarcely have failed 
to excite contemporary comment."92 
Notwithstanding these statements as to the extraterritorial 
scope of the Constitution, the Eisentrager holding rests primarily on 
the Court's finding that the German nationals seeking a writ of 
habeas corpus were "alien enemies."93 The Court reasoned that 
because alien enemies are denied constitutional protection within 
the United States, they should similarly be denied such protection 
in foreign jurisdictions.94 With a holding so narrowly focused on 
88 339 u.s. 763 (1950). 
89Id. 
90Id. Article I, § 9, clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution provides: "The Privilege of the Writ 
of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of Rebellion or Invasion the 
public Safety may require it." 
91 Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 771 (emphasis added by the Court) (quoting Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1885) (discussing the fourteenth amendment's application to 
aliens within the U.S.)). 
92 Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 784. 
93Id. at 771-85. Generally, "alien enemies" are citizens of foreign governments at war 
with the United States. 
94 See id. at 784. 
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alien enemies,95 Eisentrager provides little guidance as to whether 
friendly aliens, such as citizens of foreign countries with whom the 
United States is not at war, may maintain foreign taking claims.96 
Cases addressing issues other than foreign taking claims indicate 
that U.S. law distinguishes little, if at all, between citizens and 
friendly aliens. 97 Thus, Eisentrager's emphasis on alien enemies may 
turn the holding to the advantage of friendly aliens bringing foreign 
taking claims. 
Eisentrager was misleadingly characterized in a footnote in Paul-
ing v. McElroy, a subsequent lower court opinion, as broadly holding 
that the Constitution does not protect aliens abroad.98 Even if Reid 
does not weaken Eisentrager's earlier holding concerning extrater-
ritorial constitutional protections for aliens, Eisentrager's reasoning 
itself supports an opposite conclusion to Pauling. One could reason-
ably find support in Eisentrager's logic for an argument that because 
friendly aliens can bring just compensation claims for takings within 
the U.S., they should also be able to do so for takings in foreign 
countries. 
C. Judicial Review of Foreign Policy Acts 
1. Political Question and Act of State Doctrines 
Courts are reluctant to curb the power of the political branches 
where foreign relations are involved. 99 Courts hold, however, that 
no foreign affairs exception restricts the applicability of the fifth 
amendment's just compensation clause. 100 Still, the political question 
95 "We hold that the Constitution does not confer a right of personal security or an 
immunity from military trial and punishment upon an alien enemy engaged in the hostile 
service of a government at war with the United States." [d. at 785. 
90 Where a foreign taking claimant is a citizen of a country at war with the United States, 
however, Eisentrager's view of alien enemies' relationship to the Constitution may be relevant. 
97 See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (aliens may not be excluded from 
state welfare program benefits); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (a state's civil 
service may not exclude aliens); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (aliens may not be 
prevented from practicing law); Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976) (the 
engineering profession may not bar aliens from membership); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 
1 (1977) (aliens may not be excluded from state education benefits). But see Foley v. Connelie, 
435 U.S. 291 (1978) (a state's police force may exclude aliens). 
98 Pauling v. McElroy, 278 F.2d 252, 254 n.3 (D.C. Cir.) (affirmed dismissal for lack of 
standing of alien plaintiff's suit alleging the U.S. government's nuclear testing program 
violated the Constitution), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 835 (1960). 
99 See generally L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION at 205-24 (1972). 
100 E.g., Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1569. 
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doctrine, discussed by the Supreme Court in Baker v. CarrlOl and 
Goldwater v. Carter,102 is often considered by courts determining 
jurisdiction and justiciability of foreign taking claims. 103 
Courts employ the political question doctrine to avoid violating 
the constitutional separation of powers. 104 Thus, under the political 
question doctrine as developed in Baker and Goldwater, courts will 
refuse to consider complaints that raise issues requiring judicial 
resolution of matters constitutionally committed to "coordinate 
branches" of the U.S. government. lOS Similarly, courts will refuse 
jurisdiction of cases that require the courts to move outside the area 
of 'judicial expertise."106 A court may also invoke the political ques-
tion doctrine to deny jurisdiction where "prudential considerations" 
counsel against judicial intervention. l07 
In the area of foreign taking claims, the political question doc-
trine does not bar judicial review where the Baker and Goldwater 
standards permit. IOB Courts hold that foreign taking claims are jus-
ticiable under the political question doctrine when three elements 
are present. First, the alleged taking must have occurred within the 
territory of a foreign sovereign recognized by the U.S. Second, if 
the taking is alleged to have occurred through an act of expropri-
ation by a foreign sovereign, the validity of the expropriation must 
not be at issue. Finally, the authority of the executive branch in 
effecting the taking must not be at issue. 109 In sum, a foreign taking 
claim is justiciable if it "seeks only a determination of the lawfullness 
of the executive's deprivation of [the plaintiff's] private property 
without just compensation.""o 
Trial courts often attempt to dispose of foreign taking claims 
on the grounds that they present non-justiciable political ques-
tions. lll The Supreme Court, however, has indicated that it does 
101 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
102 444 U.S. 996 (1979). 
103 See Langenegger, 756 F.2d 1565; Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d 202; Ramirez de Arellano, 
745 F.2d 1500. For a general discussion of the political question doctrine, see L. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 71-79 (1978). 
104 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 210. 
105 Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 997-98 (Powell, j., concurring). 
106Id. 
107Id. See also Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
108 See Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1568-70 (applying Goldwater, 444 U.S. 996, and Baker, 
369 U.S. 186). 
109Id. 
1I0/d. at 1570. 
III See, e.g., de Arellano, 568 F. Supp. 1236; Langenegger, 5 Cl. Ct. 229. 
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not favor categorical treatment of cases involving potential political 
questions as non-justiciable. 112 Recent appellate decisions are in ac-
cord with the Supreme Court, generally holding that foreign taking 
claims do not raise political question issues that affect justiciability. I 13 
Similarly, the act of state doctrine, another separation of powers 
protection, 114 does not necessarily render foreign taking claims non-
justiciable. The Supreme Court articulated the basis of the act of 
state doctrine in Underhill v. Hernandez: 
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of 
every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will 
not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another 
done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason 
of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be 
availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves. I IS 
The Federal Circuit summarized the act of state doctrine III the 
foreign takings area as preventing 'Judicial relief for certain claims 
that would require the court to pass on the validity of acts of a 
foreign state."116 Foreign taking claims often allege that the U.S. 
acted directly or indirectly through a foreign sovereign. ll7 However, 
foreign taking claimants seek only to have American courts "pass 
on" the constitutionality of U.S. government acts, thus avoiding the 
act of state issue. lls 
Ironically, as Judge Wilkey observed in dicta in Ramirez de 
Arellano, a court that finds an uncompensated taking to be the act 
of a foreign sovereign, and thus non-justiciable under the act of 
state doctrine, a fortiori issues an advisory finding that the President 
of the United States is obligated to retaliate against the foreign 
sovereign under the Foreign Assistance Act. Ilg The Foreign Assis-
tance Act's "Hickenlooper Amendment" provides in part: "The 
112 See generally Leigh & Atkeson, Due Process in the Emerging Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States, 22 Bus. LAW. 3, 23-26 (1966). 
113 See, e.g., Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1570. 
114 Ramirez de Arellano, 745 F.2d at 1534. 
115 Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897), afl'd by Banco Nacional de Cuba 
v. Sabbatino, 376 U.s. 398,416-19 (1964). 
116 Ramirez de Arellano, 745 F.2d at 1533. 
117 See, e.g., Turney, 115 F. Supp. 457 (alleging that the Phillipine government seized 
plaintiffs' radar equipment and turned the equipment over to the United States). 
118 See Ramirez de Arellano, 745 F.2d at 1533 (holding that act of state doctrine could not 
bar the plaintiff's claim in any event as the defense was not raised at trial). 
119 See id. at 1539 ("under the reasoning advanced by the dissent, the President is cur-
rently derelict in his statutory duty to terminate all assistance to the government of Hon-
duras") (referring to the "statutory duty" imposed by 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(I) (1982)). 
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President shall suspend assistance to the government of any country 
... when the government of such country ... has nationalized or 
expropriated or seized ownership or control of property owned by 
any United States citizen .... "120 Because the Foreign Assistance 
Act does not contain an implied private cause of action,121 a court 
invoking the act of state doctrine in the context of a foreign taking 
action may "back into" an area proscribed to the judiciary. 
2. Exception For Wartime Takings 
A "wartime exception" may place a foreign taking outside the 
scope of the fifth amendment, reflecting the fact that many U.S. 
government property takings occur during war122 or during post-
war military occupations. 123 The wartime exception is rooted in 
post-Civil War cases that generally denied fifth amendment treat-
ment to private property, such as bridges, that the Union Army 
destroyed for strategic purposes. 124 These cases articulated the pol-
icy that compensation for all wartime acts would soon exhaust the 
public treasury.125 
The wartime exception also reflects a concept of overwhelming 
public necessity.126 In Juaragua Iron Co. v. United States,127 the Su-
preme Court addressed a wartime foreign taking claim that also 
involved public health considerations. There, the U.S. government 
destroyed a factory located in Cuba to prevent the spread of con-
120 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(I) (1982). 
121 See Aerotrade, Inc. v. Agency for Int'l Development, 387 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1974). 
122 See, e.g., United States v. Caltex (Phillipines), Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952) (although U.S. 
Army's seizure and destruction of a U.S. corporation's Manila oil refinery would be a com-
pensable taking in peacetime, the fifth amendment does not guarantee compensation where 
private property with strategic value is destroyed to prevent the enemy from seizing and 
using it), reh'g denied, 344 U.S. 919 (1953). 
123 See, e.g., Anglo-Chinese Shipping v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 535 (Ct. Cl.), cert. 
denied, 349 U.S. 938 (1955) (the Allied Command's requisition of a cable-laying vessel for use 
by occupied Japan was not a compensable taking although the Allied Command was an agent 
of the U.S.). 
124 E.g., United States v. Pacific R.R., 120 U.S. 227 (1887). Cf Aris Gloves, Inc. v. United 
States, 420 F.2d 1386 (Ct. Cl. 1970). Congress also provided a special exception from Court 
of Claims jurisdiction for claims arising out of damage by the U.S. Army and Navy during 
the Civil War. Act of July 4, 1864, ch. 240, 13 Stat. 381. 
125 See, e.g., Union Pacific RR, 120 U.S. at 235. 
126 See United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958) ("[war] 
makes demands which otherwise would be insufferable [but] which are insignificant when 
compared to the widespread uncompensated loss of life and freedom of action which war 
traditionally demands"). 
127212 U.S. 297 (1909). 
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tagious disease while the U.S. was at war with Spain. I28 The Court 
denied the just compensation claim brought by a U.S. corporation 
that owned the factory.I29 The Court's reasoning focused both on 
wartime exigencies of fighting alien enemies and on the need to 
protect the "health and safety" of U.S. troops in Cuba. I30 
Claims may be successful, even if based on government takings 
in wartime, where the plaintiff can show that the taking was arbi-
trary.I31 Courts have also found wartime takings unlawful when the 
U.S. officials effecting the takings have no congressional authority 
to do SO.I32 However, allegations of arbitrary or unauthorized gov-
ernment action in the context of foreign taking claims may raise 
political question issues, 133 and may bar the claim from Claims Court 
jurisdiction. I34 Thus, foreign taking claims arising out of wartime 
acts by the U.S. government will probably be unsuccessful. I35 
3. State Secret Privilege 
Finally, even if a foreign taking claim is justiciable and not 
within the wartime exception, the "state secret" privilege may ef-
fectively bar litigation of the matter. The federal government may 
invoke this absolute privilege to prevent disclosure of certain mat-
ters, such as those concerning national security, in the course of 
foreign takings litigation. 136 Courts evaluate the allegedly privileged 
material in camera. I37 If the privilege's scope is deemed broad 
enough, it may warrant dismissal of an otherwise justiciable claim. 
Still, no foreign taking claims have been dismissed for reasons of 
state secret privilege. Thus, with the exception of wartime-related 
claims, courts will generally adjudicate foreign taking claims despite 
their origin in the foreign policy acts of the executive and legislative 
branches of the U.S. government. 
128 See Juaragua Iron, 212 U.S. at 301-02. 
129 See id. at 310. 
130 See id. at 308-09. 
131 Idaho Maryland Mines Corp. v. United States, 104 F. Supp. 576,587-88 (Ct. Cl. 1952). 
132 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 711 (1900) (wartime capture of foreign fishing 
vessels off the coast of Cuba by U.S. government officials was unlawful because the seizures 
were unauthorized by Congress). Cf Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 
(1952) (President'S wartime seizure of domestic steel mills invalid for lack of congressional 
and constitutional authority). 
133 See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
134 See infra note 188 and accompanying text. 
135 But see Seery, 127 F. Supp. 601, discussed supra at text accompanying note 26. 
136 See Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1569. See also Foster v. U.S., 12 Cl. Ct. 492, 494 (1987). 
137 Foster, 12 CI.Ct. at 494. 
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III. ELEMENTS OF A FOREIGN TAKING 
A. Direct and Substantial U.S. Involvement 
The Langenegger decision articulated for the first time a judicial 
test to determine whether a foreign taking has occurred. The court 
indicated that a claimant must show that the U.S. government had 
"sufficiently direct and substantial" involvement in an overseas ex-
propriation to trigger just compensation liability.138 The Federal 
Circuit in Langenegger developed this test by borrowing the "suffi-
ciently direct and substantial" language verbatim from Y.M.C.A. v. 
United States, 139 a case alleging that the U.S. government took private 
property in the Panama Canal Zone. 140 
The Supreme Court in Y.M.G.A., like the Langenegger court, 
was presented with a claim that the U.S. government effected a 
taking by causing a third party to deprive the plaintiffs of the use 
of their property. In Y.M.C.A., U.S. Army troops ejected a rioting 
crowd from private buildings in the Canal Zone near the Panama-
nian border, occupied the buildings for some time, then with-
drew. 141 The crowd attacked from the Panama side of the Canal 
Zone border, damaging the buildings during and after the Army 
occupation. 142 The Court affirmed the Court of Claims' summary 
judgment dismissal of the plaintiffs' claim that the Army's actions 
caused the crowd to damage the buildings, entitling the plaintiffs 
to just compensation. 143 
13H See Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1571. The court also held that a claimant may establish 
an independent basis for a taking claim by a showing that the U.S. government acted so as 
to extinguish the claimant's otherwise live expropriation action against a foreign sovereign. 
Id. at 1573. This alternative basis follows such claim extinguishment cases as Shanghai Power. 
[d. (citing Shanghai Power, 4 Cl. Ct. 237). However, nothing in the Court of Appeals' opinions 
suggests that a claimant will be exempted from showing that the U.S. caused the claim 
extinguishment. In fact, although the Langenegger plaintiffs alleged claim extinguishment in 
the alternative, the court found that the U.S. State Department's refusal to cooperate in a 
diplomatic settlement with the government of El Salvador did not cause claim extinguishment. 
See id. at 1573. Thus, it appears that the court intended all foreign taking claims to be subject 
to a common "sufficiently direct and substantial" U.S. involvement requirement. 
139 395 U.S. 85 (1969). 
140 Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1570 (quoting Y.M.C.A., 395 U.S. at 93 ("'[I]n any case where 
government action is causally related to private misconduct which leads to property damage-
a determination must be made whether the government involvement in the deprivation of private property 
is sufficiently direct and substantial to require compensation under the Fifth Amendment."') (emphasis 
added by the court». 
141 See Y.M.e.A., 395 U.S. at 86-91. 
142 [d. 
143Id. at 93. 
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The Y.M.C.A. Court placed great weight in its reasoning on the 
fact that "[a]t the time the troops entered [the building], the riot 
was already well under way, and petitioners' buildings were already 
under heavy attack."144 In effect, the Court agreed with the Court 
of Claims' determination that the U.S. Army was not the sine qua 
non of the property damage. "[W]here government action is causally 
related to private misconduct which leads to property damage," the 
Court continued, "a determination must be made whether the gov-
ernment involvement in the deprivation of private property is suf-
ficiently direct and substantial to require compensation under the 
Fifth Amendment."145 Y.M.C.A.'s "sufficiently direct and substan-
tial" language is offered to guide courts in evaluating whether the 
U.S. caused a property deprivation. It follows, therefore, that the 
Langenegger test, based on Y.M.C.A., should be an inquiry into the 
causation of a foreign taking. 
B. The Langenegger Test 
Instead of focusing on causation, the Federal Circuit in Lan-
genegger identified two indicia of "sufficiently direct and substantial" 
U.S. involvement in an overseas expropriation. First, the court ex-
amined the "nature" of the U.S. government activity alleged to have 
caused the taking. 146 Where U.S. activity amounts only to "friendly 
persuasion," the court held, the U.S. government does not trigger 
just compensation liability. 147 The court found that U.S. encourage-
ment of the EI Salvadoran government to implement land reform 
did not rise above the level of "friendly persuasion."148 
Second, the court examined the "benefit" that accrues to the 
federal government as a result of the alleged taking. 149 Where the 
sole benefit to the U.S. government is the enhanced political stability 
of its neighboring sovereigns, a finding of "sufficient direct and 
substantial" involvement is not warranted. 150 Apparently, both 
prongs of this "nature of U.S. activity" /"U .S. benefit" analysis must 
be satisfied to demonstrate the existence of a foreign taking. 
I441d. at 92-93. 
I4Sld. at 93. 
146 Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1572. 
I47/d. 
I4Bld. 
I4"ld. 
ISOld. 
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The Langenegger court proffered this two-prong test as a syn-
thesis of earlier foreign taking decisions. 151 In fact, the court created 
this test by substantially reformulating existing takings law. To de-
velop the "nature of U.S. activity" test, the Federal Circuit in Lan-
genegger relied primarily on Porter v. United States,152 although this 
language appears nowhere in the Porter opinion. 153 The Court of 
Claims in Porter dismissed a just compensation claim alleging that 
the U.S. government was obligated under the fifth amendment for 
actions of the government of Micronesia, a U.S. Trust Territory.154 
The Court of Claims, however, dismissed Porter for lack of jurisdic-
tion,155 reasoning that the plaintiffs' "taking claims focus only on 
the actions of Trust Territory officials ... without authority to act 
on behalf of the United States."156 In contrast, the Langenegger court, 
by its own stipulation, accepted the plaintiffs' allegations that U.S. 
government actions were part of the causal chain of events leading 
to the El Salvadoran land reform program and the expropriation: 
It is undisputed and indeed well known in this country that as 
a matter of foreign policy the United States ... in the case of 
El Salvador ... strongly supported the implementation of re-
forms as necessary to stability. Appellants assert ... that the 
United States tied economic and military assistance to reform, 
provided financial aid for reform programs, and assisted in 
drafting the agrarian reform proposals by providing an expert 
who was under contract to the United States .... For summary 
judgment purposes only, we take all this as true. IS7 
l51 See id. at 1570-73 (citing, inter alia, Shanghai Power, 4 CI.Ct. 237; Best v. United States, 
292 F.2d 274 (1961); Anglo-Chinese Shipping Co. v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 553 (Ct. Cl. 
1955), eert. denied, 349 U.S. 938; Turney, 115 F. Supp. 457). 
152 496 F.2d 583 (Ct. Cl. 1974), eert. denied, 420 U.S. 1004 (1975). 
153 See Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1572 (citing Porter, 496 F.2d at 591). The Federal Circuit 
in Langenegger also cited Turney, 115 F. Supp. 457, Anglo-Chinese, 127 F. Supp. 553, and Best 
v. United States, 292 F.2d 274 (Ct. Cl. 1961) in developing its test. 756 F.2d at 72 ("The 
method of analysis of [Turney, Anglo-Chinese and Best] as well as the general doctrines an-
nounced by the Supreme Court ... are controlling here"). Langenegger's use of Turney's 
authority is discussed in the text infra. Anglo-Chinese is clearly a military occupation decision, 
of limited use for adjudicating peacetime foreign takings. See supra notes 122-23 and accom-
panying text. The Best court explicitly did not address the constitutional taking claim of 
German contractor who sought additional payments from the U.S. Army military occupation 
command. See Best, 292 F.2d at 279 ("It is obvious from the above discussion that we do not 
reach the Constitutional question"). 
154 Porter, 496 F.2d at 591-92. The claimants alleged, inter alia, that the government of 
Micronesia, a U.S. territory, obtained control of a private shipping company through coercion 
so as to subject the United States to just compensation liability. [d. 
155 [d. at 592. 
156 [d. at 591. 
157 Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1567 (emphasis added). 
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By accepting the authority of the alleged U.S. government actions 
and granting jurisdiction to the Langenegger claim, the Federal Cir-
cuit necessarily placed the claim outside the control of jurisdictional 
decisions such as Porter. Although Porter stressed that its holding 
reflected the plaintiffs' failure to adequately plead unconstitutional 
U.S. activity, Langenegger relies on Porter despite specific allegations 
of U.S. wrongdoing. 
The Langenegger court's reliance on Porter also seems misplaced 
in light of the Federal Circuit's stipulation that "[i]f the Salvadoran 
government had not been amenable to United States recommen-
dations, it could have expected a loss of financial support."!58 The 
Porter court distinguished its plaintiffs' fatal failure to allege autho-
rized U.S. actions from the Court of Claims' finding that the Phil-
Ii pine government's action in Turney v. United States!59 "was 
prompted by 'irresistible pressure' from the United States."!60 Lan-
genegger's factual stipulation of U.S. financial leverage on EI Salva-
dor appears to supply the element of U.S. pressure absent in Porter. 
The Porter decision's distinction of its facts from Turney's indicates 
that a showing of such U.S. pressure would increase the persua-
siveness of cases awarding compensation in foreign taking claims, 
such as Turney. Yet the Langenegger court followed Porter, not Turney. 
Finally, the Langenegger court used its "nature of U.S. activity" test, 
constructed on Porter's foundation, in order to dismiss the plaintiffs' 
claim on the merits in summary judgment. This substantive test 
mischaracterizes Porter, which simply articulates a test for determin-
ing whether the Claims Court has jurisdiction. Thus, it is at best 
uncertain whether Porter supports the "nature of activity" test that 
Langenegger cites it for. 
As the second prong of its inquiry into whether U.S. involve-
ment was sufficiently direct and substantial to require just compen-
sation, the Langenegger court looked to the amount of benefit that 
the U.S. government received from the alleged foreign taking.!6! 
The court relied heavily on Turney in formulating this element of 
its test to determine whether a compensable taking occurred.!62 
Turney, however, introduced an entirely different concept of benefit 
into foreign takings jurisprudence, calling into question Langeneg-
ger's reliance on the case. 
15Sld. 
159 115 F. Supp. 457. 
160 Porter, 496 F.2d at 592 (citing Turney, 115 F. Supp. at 463-64). 
161 Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1571-72. 
162 See id. 
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The purpose of the benefit test in Turney was to determine the 
amount of compensation to be awarded just compensation claimants 
in certain circumstances. The Turney court determined that the V.S. 
pressured the Phillipine government to seize radar equipment on 
its behalf from the plaintiff. 163 The court also found that this pres-
sure substantially caused the Phillipine government to seize the 
equipment, constituting a taking under the fifth amendment. 164 
Prior to the seizure, the Phillipine government imposed an embargo 
on export of the equipment, effectively reducing the equipment's 
fair market value to zero. 165 Thus, to value the compensation due 
the plaintiff, the Turney court looked to the V.S. government's 
replacement cost for the equipment, reasoning that the government 
benefitted by at least this amount. 166 Notwithstanding the Lange-
negger court's assertions to the contrary, Turney did not determine 
the existence of a foreign taking by reference to V.S. benefit. 
The benefit test also conflicts with domestic takings doctrine. 
This doctrine is grounded on the view that the framers of the 
Constitution intended the fifth amendment to place the burden on 
the public where the government uses private property for the 
public good. 167 The rationale behind requiring government com-
pensation for public use of private property is that government 
power should be constrained from infringing upon private property 
interests. 168 The Langenegger court's benefit test appears to be cal-
culated to determine whether the V.S. government truly derived 
public use from an expropriation of overseas property.169 Yet the 
Supreme Court has held that the federal government need not take 
property for its own use to constitute a compensable takingYo A 
163 Turney, 115 F. Supp. at 463-64. 
161 [d. 
165 [d. 
166 [d. 
167 See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960) ("The Fifth Amendment's 
guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation 
was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."). 
16" See Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 176-81 (l871). See aLm 
Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 309 (1795). 
169 See Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1572 ("[A] benefit of hemispheric stability must be 
characterized as a benefit only incidental to the expropriation. The expropriation by [EI 
Salvador's] legislation was for the benefit of that country's national interest ... and was not 
for the United States' public benefit.") (emphasis added). 
17U Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (using "private enterprise 
for redevelopment of [a condemned] area" is within the U.S. government's constitutional 
power of eminent domain). 
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taking claim may lie even if a non-governmental party derives the 
tangible benefit of the taking.!7! Courts traditionally defer to 
congressional determination of which public uses justify exercising 
the sovereign taking power: 
We deal ... with what traditionally has been known as the police 
power. An attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits is 
fruitless, for each case must turn on its own facts. The definition 
is essentially the product of legislative determinations addressed 
to the purposes of government, purposes neither abstractly nor 
historically capable of complete definition. Subject to specific 
constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the 
public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclu-
sive.!72 
The Langenegger decision advances no reason why the court should 
not have similarly deferred to Congress' foreign policy goal of 
"hemispheric stability"!73 as a "public use" justifying a foreign tak-
mg. 
Many U.S. foreign policy acts involve decisions and authoriza-
tion originating in the executive branch. In the just compensation 
area, however, such executive involvement does not allow courts to 
proceed as if no delegated congressional authority exists. Courts 
hearing just compensation claims may find implied congressional 
authorization when a taking is "a natural consequence of Congres-
sionally approved measures."!74 With numerous congressional ap-
propriations bills directing funds to various foreign policy activities, 
an argument that a foreign taking is the "natural consequence" of 
congressional action seems eminently reasonable. Foreign taking 
claims are rarely denied for lack of delegated congressional au-
thority.!75 
A focus on governmental benefit in determining whether a 
compensable taking occurred also suggests a rigidity in takings anal-
ysis rejected decades ago by the Supreme Court. In the late 19th 
century, takings law required that the government obtain a posses-
171 See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). See also Hawaii Housing Authority, 467 
U.S. at 243-44 ("The mere fact that property taken outright by eminent domain is trans-
ferred in the first instance to private beneficiaries does not condemn that taking as having 
only a private purpose"). 
172 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. at 32-33. 
173 Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1572. 
174 NBH Land Co. v. United States, 576 F.2d 317, 319 (Ct. Cl. 1978). See also generally 
infra notes 188-90 and accompanying text. 
175 But see The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). 
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sory interest to support a compensable taking claim. 176 By the early 
20th century, however, courts no longer accepted this literal defi-
nition of property as "absolute dominion over things."177 At the 
same time, the Court shifted its focus in property taking claims to 
an examination of the magnitude of private loss balanced against 
public advantage. 178 The benefit analysis moves away from the flex-
ible balancing test, resisting the Supreme Court's preference for 
non-formulaic determinations of what constitutes a compensable 
exercise of the police power. 179 
C. Foreign Takings Without the Langenegger Test 
Langenegger's two-prong "nature of U.S. activity" and "U.S. 
benefit" threshold test is perhaps best understood as an attempt to 
prevent raids on the U.S. Treasury through the just compensation 
clause. Sensitivity to limitations on government resources is not 
inappropriate in the area of takings law. As one commentator ob-
serves, just compensation rules "must not cost so much in awards 
to owners that no government would pay them without serious 
disruption of function."18o Courts today may be alarmed at the 
expanding definition of foreign takings that appears to include 
indirect takings and possibly compensation claims brought by aliens 
in connection with property seized abroad. Langenegger's gloss on 
what constitutes "sufficiently direct and substantial" U.S. involve-
ment, however, reintroduces into takings law an insensitivity to the 
facts and circumstances of each case. Existing foreign takings law 
and threshold requirements for Claims Court jurisdiction may be 
176 See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 667-69 (1887) (State regulation barring 
operation of a brewery held not to be a taking because, inter alia, the state did not physically 
appropriate property). See also Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L. J. 36,36-41 
(1964). 
177 See Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern 
Concept of Property, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 325, 328-29 (1980) ("As the 19th century progressed, 
increased exceptions to both physicalist and absolutist ... conception[s] of property were 
incorporated [by courts that] increasingly sought to protect valuable interests as property 
even though no thing was involved"). By the early 20th century, courts generally accepted a 
new characterization of property as "a set of legal relations among persons." [d. at 330. 
178 See, e.g., Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 110 (1911) (Holmes, J., writing 
for the Court) (no compensable taking because comparatively insignificant private loss was 
justified by public advantage). 
179 See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980) ("No precise rule 
determines when property has been taken"); Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 
U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (,,[T]his Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set 
formula"'). 
180 Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 165, 170 (1974). 
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able to protect the Treasury, similar to the Langenegger test, while 
respecting current takings doctrine that focuses on the claimant's 
loss, not on the government's benefit. 
Claimants seeking monetary compensation for a foreign taking 
in the Claims Court must satisfy the requirements of the Tucker 
Act. The Tucker Act, as amended, establishes the Claims Court as 
a court of special jurisdiction empowered to hear those categories 
of claims against the V.S. government defined by Congress. These 
claims include constitutional causes of action such as just compen-
sation claims. 181 The Claims Court shares jurisdiction with V.S. 
district courts for such claims up to $10,000,182 but enjoys exclusive 
jurisdiction of claims in excess of this amount pursuant to 28 V.S.C. 
§ 1491. 183 Thus, any significant threat to the V.S. Treasury by for-
eign taking claims is posed through such claims brought in the 
Claims Court. 
A broad category of foreign taking claims are removed from 
Claims Court jurisdiction by the general doctrine that the court has 
no power to grant declaratory judgment or injunctive relief. 184 The 
Claims Court need not consider whether a claimant has any other 
forum in which to vindicate a claim in denying jurisdiction. 185 For 
mixed claims similar to Ramirez de Arellano, this jurisdictional rule 
may reduce the number of monetary just compensation claims in 
excess of $10,000 by forcing claimants to pursue such mixed claims 
IBI The 1887 Tucker Act, codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1491, extended the juris-
diction of the Court of Claims to include just compensation actions: "The Court of Claims 
shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded 
... upon the Constitution .... " 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982). See also H. R. REP. No. 1077, 49th 
Cong., 1st Sess. at 3-4 (1886). The Court of Claims was created by the Congressional Act of 
Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612. In 1982, § 133(a) of the Federal Courts Improvement 
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164,96 Stat. 25, 39-40, transferred original jurisdiction formerly 
vested in the Court of Claims to the newly created United States Claims Court. The Claims 
Court is an Article I court. See S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. at 7-8 (1981); H. R. 
REP. No. 312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. at 24-26 (1981). 
IB2 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1982). 
IB3 See, e.g., International Engineering Co., Div. of A-T-O, Inc. v. Richardson, 512 F.2d 
573 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1048 (1975); Chelsea Community Hospital, SNF 
v. Michigan Blue Cross Ass'n, 630 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1980). 
IB4 The Claims Court generally lacks the power to grant equitable relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
(1982). The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 133, 96 Stat. 
25 at 39 (1982), gives the Claims Court equitable jurisdiction in certain personal and contract 
matters. Cf United States v. King, 395 U.S. I, 3 (1969) (no jurisdiction for declaratory 
judgment claims); Austin v. United States, 206 Ct. Cl. 719, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 911 (1975) 
(no affirmative non-monetary relief power unless tied to and subordinate to monetary award). 
IB5 See Porter v. United States, 496 F.2d at 591 (citing Kyer v. United States, 369 F.2d 
714,719 (1966)). 
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in U.S. dictrict court. Of course, nothing prevents a claimant from 
first bringing the equitable portion of a mixed claim in U.S. district 
court, then proceeding in Claims Court with the monetary claim. 186 
Such an approach, however, confronts the plaintiff with the pros-
pect of collateral estoppel binding the Claims Court to the district 
court's determination of facts and law. 187 This prospect may make 
litigation strategy sufficiently complex to deter mixed claims from 
being brought frequently. 
Courts seeking to "weed out" illegitimate foreign taking claims 
could also accomplish their goal by requiring a higher threshold 
showing of congressional authority in such claims. For Court of 
Claims jurisdiction, a taking must be expressly or impliedly autho-
rized by an act of Congress. 188 Foreign takings often occur pursuant 
to actions by the executive branch's foreign policy powers. In do-
mestic taking claims, congressional authority is often broadly de-
fined, 'and may even be found by a court where the taking is "a 
natural consequence of Congressionally approved measures."189 In 
the foreign takings area, however, precedent exists for the Claims 
Court to reject jurisdiction of claims failing to sufficiently allege 
congressional authority.190 
The congressionally established "treaty exception" to the 
Tucker Act 191 may also bar certain foreign taking claims from 
Claims Court jurisdiction. Under this exception, the Claims Court 
has no jurisdiction where a plaintiff's claim could not conceivably 
exist independently of a treaty or other agreement concluded be-
tween the United States and a foreign sovereign. 192 The treaty 
exception has been construed narrowly. For example, U.S. citizens 
in Anderson v. United States 193 sought compensation in the Claims 
Court after the U.S. government's operation of a dam caused flood-
ing of their leasehold located in Mexico. 194 The Anderson court held 
that the treaty exception did not bar jurisdiction of the leasehold 
taking, although the complaint sought in part to establish that the 
186 See, e.g" Giordano v. Roudebush, 617 F.2d 511 (8th Cir. 1980). 
187 See, e.g., Hahn v. United States, 757 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1985). 
188 See generally Regional Rail Reorganization Cases, 95 S.Ct. 335 (1974). See also NBH 
Land Co., 576 F.2d 317. 
189 NBH Land Co., 576 F.2d at 319. 
190 See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 711. 
191 28 U.S.C. § 1502 (1982). 
192 See generally Hughes Aircraft CO. V. United States, 534 F.2d 889 (1976). 
193 7 Cl. Ct. 341 (1985). 
194 Anderson, 7 Cl. Ct. at 342. 
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U.S. government's actions violated a U.S.-Mexico treaty. 195 Similarly, 
the Supreme Court in Dames & Moore v. Regan l96 held that the treaty 
exception did not bar Court of Claims jurisdiction where the federal 
government allegedly extinguished plaintiff's expropriation claims 
against the newly formed government of Iran. 197 In Dames & Moore, 
agreements between Iran and the United States discharged all 
claims against Iran currently pending in U.S. courts and established 
the Hague facility as the sole tribunal through which such claims 
could be settled. 198 One commentator argues that the legislative 
history and subsequent interpretation of the treaty exception sup-
ports a broader prohibition of just compensation claims that arise 
solely out of the collateral effects of U.S. foreign policy.199 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The definition of compensable foreign takings is broad, includ-
ing both direct and indirect overseas expropriations of property by 
the U.S. government. Aliens, as well as U.S. citizens, may be able 
to claim the protection of the just compensation clause against the 
United States' uncompensated use or destruction of their property 
in foreign jurisdictions. Application of the just compensation clause 
to aliens' property abroad is supported by analogy to fourth amend-
ment decisions and by the increasingly accepted view since Reid v. 
Covert that constitutional protections apply uniformly to those af-
fected by United States actions. This constitutional remedy is of 
particular interest to those with property interests in developing 
countries, where an interventionist American foreign policy in-
creases the likelihood of a foreign taking. 
Still, a potential foreign taking claimant faces significant bar-
riers to his claim. Colorable foreign taking claims must meet re-
quirements that reflect the fact that these claims arise within the 
context of U.S. foreign relations. Thus, a claim must not challenge 
the alleged foreign taking as arbitrary or unauthorized. A claim 
must be justiciable under the political question and act of state 
doctrines. Claims arising out of wartime acts by the government will 
195Id. at 343. 
196 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
197 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 690-91. 
198Id. at 664-65. 
199 See generally P. R. Trimble, Foreign Policy Frustrated - Dames & Moore, Claims Court 
jurisdiction and a New Raid on the Treasury, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 317, and especially at 325-62 
(1984). 
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probably not be compensable. Claims Court jurisdictional require-
ments are added to these limitations. 
The Langenegger court adds another restriction on foreign tak-
ing claims by focusing on what benefit the U.S. derived from the 
expropriation as a test of whether a foreign taking occurred. This 
approach conflicts with established just compensation authority that 
focuses on whether taking claimants make a colorable argument 
that the U.S. caused property to be seized or destroyed. The Lan-
genegger benefit test also questions the explicit or implicit judgment 
of Congress that certain foreign policy goals constitute proper pub-
lic purposes that support U.S. sovereign acts abroad. In the area of 
takings law, however, courts must defer to Congress' judgment. 
When the exercise of sovereign power to accomplish a congression-
ally authorized purpose produces a public use of private property, 
the just compensation clause provides a remedy for the property 
owner. Under the Langenegger approach, a property taking proxi-
mately caused by the United States' foreign policy apparatus may 
be dismissed prior to trial by a judge who finds that the taking 
produced no identifiable benefit for the United States. Such a find-
ing substitutes the court's evaluation of United States foreign policy 
for that of the legislative and executive branches which create it. 
This policy evaluation by the court, in the area of takings law that 
gives considerable deference to legislative purpose, exceeds any-
one's definition of the boundaries of the judicial function. 
Rather than exhume 19th century takings doctrine that focused 
on whether the sovereign literally took property, courts adjudicating 
foreign taking claims should turn their attention to existing thresh-
old requirements and jurisdictional tests. Attention to these require-
ments will allow courts to ensure that the Langenegger test remains 
an anomaly in foreign takings jurisprudence. Most importantly, 
these traditional limitations protect the Treasury while preserving 
a necessary flexibility in determining whether the U.S. government 
causes compensable takings to occur in foreign jurisdictions. 
Remsen M. Kinne IV 
